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Abstract
We study the problem of precluding biological invasions caused by ships transporting
internationally traded goods in containers between different regions of the world. Using the long run
expected net cost   of inspections as the apposite managerial objective, we address the (LRENC)
following important question: Given that inspection is a cyclical activity, is the   lower when LRENC
a port manager’s inspector inspects cargo upon the arrival of a specified number of containers
(container policy) or is this   lower when this inspector inspects cargo at fixed points in time LRENC
(temporal policy)? We construct a queuing theoretic model and show that in an inspection cycle,
irrespective of whether the inspection policy choice is made on the basis of an explicit optimization
exercise or on the basis of rules of thumb, the container policy is superior to the temporal policy
because the container policy results in lower   from inspection activities.  LRENC
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In the rest of this paper, we shall use the terms “alien species,” “invasive species,” and “non-native species” interchangeably.
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For additional details on this subject, the reader should consult Batabyal and Beladi (2004), Batabyal et al. (2004), and the many
references in these two papers.
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1. Introduction
It is now well known that maritime trade in goods comprises a significant fraction of the
world’s total international trade in goods. Ships are the primary vehicle in maritime trade and, in
contemporary times, ships are routinely used to transport a whole host of goods in containers from
one region of the world to another. Although there are clear gains to the involved parties from such
voluntary trade between the different regions of the world, researchers have increasingly noted that
the magnitude of these gains is likely to be less than what most observers have hitherto believed. Why
is this the case? As Heywood (1995), Parker et al. (1999), and Batabyal (2004) have pointed out, this
is because in addition to transporting goods in containers between regions, ships have also succeeded
in transporting a variety of alien plant and animal species
4 from one geographical region to another.
Broadly speaking, ships have transported non-native species in two main ways. First, a variety
of marine alien species have been introduced into a region, often unwittingly, by ships dumping their
ballast water. Cargo ships routinely carry ballast water in order to increase vessel stability when they
are not carrying full loads. When these ships come into port, this ballast water must be released before
cargo can be loaded. This method of species introductions is important and very recently the problem
of managing invasive species that have been introduced into a particular region by means of the
dumping of ballast water has received some attention in the literature.
5 
The second way in which alien species have been introduced into a specific region is by means3
of the containers that ships commonly use to transport cargo from one region to another. Indeed,
non-native species can remain undetected in containers for long periods of time. In addition, the
material (such as wood) that is used to pack the cargo in the containers may itself contain alien
species. In this connection, a joint report from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA),
the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the United States Forest Service
(USFS) has noted that approximately 51.8% of maritime shipments contain solid wood packing
materials and that infection rates for solid wood packing materials are non-trivial (USDA, APHIS,
and USFS (2000, p. 25)). For example, inspections of wooden spools from China revealed infection
rates between 22% and 24% and inspections of braces for granite blocks imported into Canada were
found to contain live insects 32% of the time (USDA, APHIS, and USFS (2000, pp. 27-28)). 
The non-native species that we have been discussing generally thus far have frequently
succeeded in invading their new habitats and the resulting biological invasions have turned out to be
very costly for the regions in which these novel habitats are located. For the United States alone, the
dollar value of these costs is mind boggling. To see this, consider the following two examples. First,
the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA (1993)) has calculated that the Russian wheat aphid
caused $600 million worth of crop damage between 1987 and 1989. Second, Pimentel et al. (2000)
have estimated the total costs of all non-native species at around $137 billion per year. 
In addition to the economic costs that we have just noted, invasive species have given rise to
significant biological damage as well. In this regard, Vitousek et al. (1996) have demonstrated that
non-native species can change ecosystem processes, act as vectors of diseases, and decrease
biological diversity. Further, Cox (1993) has noted that out of 256 vertebrate extinctions with a
known cause, 109 are the result of biological invasions. The implication of the discussion in this and4
the preceding paragraph is clear: Biological invasions have frequently been a great menace to society.
Very recently, economists and regional scientists have acknowledged the salience of the
problem of biological invasions. Even so, it is still true that “the economics of the problem
has...attracted little attention” (Perrings et al. (2000, p. 11)). Therefore, our knowledge of the
economic and the management aspects of invasive species is very incomplete. Now, from the
standpoint of a manager, there are various actions that he can take to deal with the problem of
biological invasions. Following Batabyal and Beladi (2004), it is helpful to separate these actions into
pre-invasion and post-invasion actions. The purpose of pre-invasion actions is to preclude alien
species from invading a new region. Therefore, the reader should think of pre-invasion actions as
fundamentally prophylactic in nature. In contrast, post-invasion actions involve the optimal control
of an alien species, given that this species has already invaded a novel region.
The focus of the small extant literature on biological invasions has, for the most part, been on
the desirability of actions in the post-invasion scenario. Here mention here four examples of such
analyses. First, Barbier (2001) has shown that the economic impact of a biological invasion can be
determined by examining the nature of the interaction between the alien and the native species. He
notes that the economic impact depends on whether this interaction involves interspecific competition
or dispersion. Second, Eiswerth and Johnson (2002) have studied a dynamic model of alien species
stock management. They show that the optimal level of management effort is responsive to ecological
factors that are not only species and site specific but also random. Third, Olson and Roy (2002) have
used a stochastic framework to explore the conditions under which it is optimal to wipe out an alien
species and conditions under which it is not optimal to do so. Finally, Eiswerth and van Kooten
(2002) have shown that in some circumstances, it is possible to use information provided by experts5
to develop a model in which it is optimal to not eradicate but instead control the spread of an invasive
species.
Our search of the pertinent literature located only three papers that have theoretically analyzed
the prevention problem; that is, the regulation of a possibly injurious alien species before it has
invaded a particular region. These three papers are Horan et al. (2002), Batabyal and Beladi (2004),
and Batabyal et al. (2004). Horan et al. (2002) compare the properties of management strategies
under full information and under uncertainty. Batabyal and Beladi (2004) study optimization problems
stemming from the steady state analysis of two multi-person inspection regimes. Finally, Batabyal et
al. (2004) show that if decreasing the economic cost associated with inspections is significant then
it makes more sense for a port manager to choose the inspection regime with fewer inspectors and
less stringent inspections. In contrast, if reducing the damage from biological invasions is more salient
then this manager ought to pick the inspection regime with more inspectors and more stringent
inspections.
Like Batabyal et al. (2004), we also focus on the inspection aspect of the management
problem. However, unlike their paper, we study here a very different question. Specifically, using the
long run expected net cost   of inspections as the apposite managerial objective, we address (LRENC)
the following important question: Given the cyclical nature of the inspection function, is the LRENC
of inspections lower when a port manager follows a policy of inspecting cargo upon the arrival of a
specified number of containers (the container policy) or is this   lower when this manager LRENC
inspects cargo at fixed points in time (the temporal policy)? We construct a queuing model—that is
different from the model used in Batabyal et al. (2004)—and show that in an inspection cycle,
irrespective of whether the inspection policy choice is made on the basis of an explicit optimization6
exercise or on the basis of rules of thumb, the container policy is superior to the temporal policy
because the container policy results in lower   from inspection activities.  LRENC
The theoretical framework of this paper is adapted from Batabyal et al. (2001) and Ross (2003,
pp. 515-519) and the rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first provides a primer on
queuing theory and then this section provides a stylized account of biological invasions in the context
of a queuing theoretic model of the inspection policy choice problem faced by a port manager. Section
3 analyzes this choice problem for the case in which the port manager wishes to minimize the LRENC
from cargo inspections by optimally choosing the number of containers to inspect in an inspection
cycle. Section 4 studies a similar model. However, in this section, the port manager minimizes the
 from cargo inspections by optimally choosing the temporal inspection point in an inspection LRENC
cycle. Section 5 compares the optimized value of the port manager’s   from sections 3 and 4 LRENC
and thereby determines which inspection policy results in lower   Section 6 concludes and LRENC.
offers a suggestion for future research on the subject of invasive species management.
2. Queuing Theory and the Choice of Inspection Policy
2.1. Preliminaries
The purpose of queuing theory—see Wolff (1989), Kulkarni (1995), Taylor and Karlin (1998),
and Ross (2003) for textbook accounts—is to mathematically analyze waiting lines or queues. Three
features are common to all queuing models. Specifically, they can be described by a stochastic arrival
process, a probabilistic service time distribution function, and a fixed number of servers. In the queuing
model that we employ in this paper, the arrival process is the Poisson process. Therefore, the times
between successive arrivals are exponentially distributed and the exponential distribution is memoryless
or Markovian. Hence, the Poisson arrival process is commonly described by the letter M.7
In general, the service times are random variables. Therefore, these times can, in principle, be
arbitrarily distributed and this is assumed in our paper. Therefore, we use the letter   to denote the G
general service time distribution function. Finally, the deterministic number of servers is typically
denoted by some positive integer. In this paper, servers are inspectors. Moreover, our analysis will be
conducted from the perspective of a port manager who employs a so called representative inspector
(hereafter inspector). As such, we shall work with a single inspector. In the language of queuing
theory, our model corresponds to the well known   queuing model.  M/G/1
2.2. A stylized account of biological invasions
Consider a stylized, publically owned port in a particular coastal region of some country. Upon
arrival at this port, ships unload their containers carrying cargo. The arrival of these containers
coincides with the arrival of a whole host of conceivably deleterious biological organisms. Now, before
this incoming cargo can be moved to various points in the interior of the country under consideration,
the containers must first be inspected at the inspection facility in our port. The purpose of this
protective activity is to ensure that one or more biological invasions—with potentially adverse
consequences for the economy and the ecology of the country under study—do not in fact take place.
We suppose that the arrival rate of the various biological organisms is proportional to the arrival rate
of the containers at the inspection facility. Therefore, we shall not model the biological organisms
directly. Instead, we shall focus on the containers that bring these organisms to our port. Further, the
arrival process of the containers at the inspection facility in our port represents the arrival process for
the queuing model that we analyze in this paper. Finally, we assume that the containers in question
arrive at the inspection facility in accordance with a Poisson process with rate α.
The manager of our port is interested in precluding invasions by the possibly injurious8
biological organisms. As such, in this paper, his basic choice problem is to determine which of two
possible inspection policies he ought to have in place. Now, from the standpoint of invasive species
management, note the following key features of inspections. First, inspections are physically costly to
undertake. Second, quite apart from the cost of conducting physical inspections, inspections also
impose an economic cost on society. This cost arises from the fact that while containers are being
inspected, there is no unloading or loading of cargo and hence economic activity in our port is very
slow if not at a standstill. Third, properly conducted inspections reduce (and perhaps even eliminate)
the likelihood of a biological invasion. In the following sections 3 and 4, we shall explicitly model these
three features of inspections.
The reader will note that inspections generally require varying amounts of time. For example,
if the inspector knows that a batch of containers awaiting inspection are all from a particular country
from which either zero or few invaders have emerged in the past then he may be able to clear this batch
of containers relatively quickly. On the other hand, if the containers awaiting inspection are either from
several nations or from a nation with a known history of invasive species problems then more time will
generally be needed to clear the containers in question. The upshot of this discussion is that the
inspection times are random variables. Given this state of affairs, let   denote the inspection time I
random variable and let   denote its expectation. The reader will recall that   has a general E[I] I
cumulative distribution function. Let us denote this function by   The key pieces of our queuing G(@).
theoretic model are now in place. Therefore, we now systematically analyze the container policy first
in section 3 and then the temporal policy in section 4. 
3. The Container Policy
Containers arrive at the inspection facility in accordance with a Poisson process with rate α.9
The port manager’s inspector examines the containers that have arrived at the inspection facility and
he continues to do so until all the containers that are present have been inspected. When this busy
period ends, the inspector leaves the inspection facility and he returns only when   new containers N
have arrived and are awaiting inspection. As a result of these inspections, the inspector—and
ultimately the port manager—incurs costs and obtains benefits from two sources. The first source of
net cost (total cost less total benefit) arises from things like the expense of paying the inspector and
operating the inspection equipment (a cost) and from the reduction in the likelihood of a biological
invasion (a benefit). We model this first source of net cost by supposing that our inspector incurs net
cost at the rate of   dollars per container per unit time. The second source of net cost stems from c
things like the deleterious impact on society from the slowdown in economic activity while the
containers are being inspected (a cost) and from the determination of whether the containers actually
contain what they are supposed to contain (a benefit). We account for this second source of net cost
by supposing that the inspector incurs a net cost of   dollars each time he returns to the inspection C
facility. 
The reader should note that the inspection function is cyclical in nature. In other words, when
containers have arrived at the facility in our port, the inspector is busy inspecting these containers until
there are no more containers waiting to be inspected. This is the busy period. Then comes an idle
period in which the inspector has no specific duties to perform. Then, when   additional containers N
arrive at the facility to be inspected, a new busy period commences. This busy period is followed by
an idle period and so on and so forth. Given this state of affairs, if we say that a cycle is completed
whenever the inspector returns to the inspection facility, then the delineation of events in the previous6
See Ross (1996, pp. 132-140) and Ross (2003, pp. 416-425) for more on renewal-reward processes in general and the renewal-
reward theorem in particular.
7
We shall soon describe the port manager’s optimization problem as a long run expected net cost minimization problem. This
notwithstanding, the reader should note that without any substantive changes, we could also have delineated this manager’s
optimization problem as a long run expected net benefit maximization problem.
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paragraph constitutes a renewal-reward process.
6 Therefore, we can use the renewal-reward theorem
to compute our port manager’s   from inspection activities.
7 Let   denote LRENC E[net cost per cycle]
the expected net cost of inspections per cycle. Similarly, let   denote the expected E[length of cycle]
length of an inspection cycle. Then, the renewal-reward theorem tells us that the inspector’s LRENC
is given by a specific ratio and that ratio is
(1) LRENC'E[net cost per cycle]
E[length of cycle]
.
Given this setup, our port manager’s problem is to choose   optimally to minimize the   of N LRENC
inspections. 
Let us now calculate the two expectations on the right hand side (RHS) of equation (1).
Consider a time interval of length   which begins at the first time during an inspection cycle in which Lj
there are   containers in the facility and ends at the first time thereafter that there are only  j j&1
containers. Then   is the total amount of time that the inspector is busy checking containers Σ
j'N
j'1Lj
during an inspection cycle. To this time we now add the average time for which our inspector is idle
until   new containers arrive at the inspection facility. Doing this gives us N
(2) E[length of cycle]'j
j'N
j'1
E[Lj]%N
α
.11
Now consider the moment in time when an inspection is about to begin and there are j&1
containers waiting to be inspected. We assume that the inspection times do not depend on the order
in which the containers are inspected. As such, suppose that the order of inspection is last in, first out
or LIFO. Then, as noted in Ross (2003, pp. 322-324), this means that the amount of time it takes to
go from   containers waiting in the facility to be inspected to   containers waiting to be inspected jj &1
has the same distribution as the length of the busy period   of the   queuing model. Now, from BM /G/1
equation 8.31 in Ross (2002, p. 253), it follows that 
(3) E[Lj]'E[B]' E[I]
1&αE[I]
,
where   the reader will recall, is the inspection time random variable. For equation (3)—and indeed I,
many of the subsequent equations in this paper—to make sense, we must have   Therefore, αE[I]<1.
in the rest of this paper we assume that this inequality holds. Now, using equation (3) to simplify
equation (2), we get 
(4) E[length of cycle]'j
j'N
j'1
E[I]
1&αE[I]
%N
α
' N
α(1&αE[I])
.
This completes the task of calculating the expected length of an inspection cycle. We now compute
the numerator on the RHS of equation 1 or the expected net cost per inspection cycle incurred by our
port manager’s inspector.
To compute   let   be the net cost incurred by the inspector during a E[net cost per cycle], ˆ Cj
time period of length   where   is as described in the paragraph immediately preceding equation Lj, Lj8
This result follows from proposition 2.2.1 in Ross (1996, p. 64) and proposition 7.2.1 in Ross (2002, p. 203).
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(2). Then it follows that the total net cost incurred during the busy period of an inspection cycle is
 To this, we now have to add the net cost incurred during the idle period of the inspection Σ
j'N
j'1 ˆ Cj%C.
cycle. Note that because the containers arrive at the inspection facility in accordance with a Poisson
process with rate   there will be   containers in the facility for an exponential amount of time with α, j
rate   and the index   runs from 1 to 
8 Therefore, the total expected net cost during the idle α jN &1.
period is   With this computation in place, the total expected net c(1%2%3%...%N&1)/α'cN(N&1)/2α.
cost in an inspection cycle or   is E[net cost per cycle]
(5) E[net cost per cycle]'j
j'N
j'1
E[ ˆ Cj]%C%cN(N&1)
2α
.
Our next task is to find an expression for   To do this, recall the time interval of length  E[ ˆ Cj]. Lj.
During this time interval, let   be the sum of the initial inspection time and the sum of all the times Sj
spent in the inspection facility by the containers that have arrived and have been inspected until the Lj
time interval ends and there are only   containers in the inspection facility. Mathematically, we can j&1
write this as   To proceed further, it is important to recognize that   is distributed ˆ Cj'(j&1)cLj%cSj. Sj
as the sum of the times spent in the inspection facility by all the arriving containers during the busy
period of the   queuing model. Let us denote this sum random variable and its expectation by  M/G/1 Bs
and by   respectively. Then, using equation (3) and the expression for   above, we get E[Bs] ˆ Cj
(6) E[ ˆ Cj]'(j&1)cE[Lj]%cE[Sj]'(j&1)c E[I]
1&αE[I]
%cE[Bs].9
The reader can check to see that the relevant second order condition is satisfied.
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From Ross (2003, p. 518), we conclude that E[Bs]'αE[I 2]/{2(1&αE[I])2}%E[I]/(1&αE[I]).
Using this last expression for   and equation (6), we can simplify equation (5). This simplification E[Bs]
gives
(7) E[net cost per cycle]'cN[ αE[I 2]
2(1&αE[I])
2% E[I]
1&αE[I]
]%C% cN(N&1)
2α(1&αE[I])
.
Now dividing the RHS of equation (7) by the RHS of equation (4), we get our required expression
for the   of inspections. That expression is LRENC
(8) LRENC'αcE[I]% α2cE[I 2]
2(1&αE[I])
%c(N&1)
2
%αC(1&αE[I])
N
.
Having computed the expression for the   of inspections, we are now in a position to LRENC
state our port manager’s optimization problem. Specifically, this manager chooses the number of
containers   to minimize the   from inspection activities. Formally, our port manager solves N LRENC
(9) min{N}[αcE[I]% α2cE[I 2]
2(1&αE[I])
%c(N&1)
2
%αC(1&αE[I])
N
].
Treating   as a continuous control variable and using calculus, we see that the optimal number of N
containers   that minimizes the port manager’s   is given by
9 N ( LRENC14
(10) N (' 2αC(1&αE[I])
c
.
In words, equation (10) tells us that the optimal number of containers   equals the square root of N (
the ratio of the product of twice the Poisson arrival rate of containers  the second source of net (α),
cost   and the term   to the first source of net cost   Inspecting equation (10) it is easy (C), (1&αE[I]) (c).
to verify two properties of the optimal number of containers   First, as the second source of net N (.
cost   increases, it is in the interest of the port manager to raise the optimal number of containers (C)
in the inspection cycle. Second, if the first source of net cost   goes up, then the port manager finds (c)
it desirable to lower the optimal number of containers in the inspection cycle.
Let us now substitute the expression for the optimal number of containers from equation (10)
into the minimand in equation (9). This gives us an expression for the minimal   that our port LRENC
manager will incur by selecting the number of containers in the inspection cycle optimally. Let this
minimal   be   where the subscript   denotes the container policy. Some algebra LRENC (LRENC)
(
CP, CP
tells us that
(11) (LRENC)
(
CP'αcE[I]% α2cE[I 2]
2(1&αE[I])
% 2αcC(1&αE[I])& c
2
.
Inspecting equations (8) and (11), we see that the first two terms on the RHSs of these two equations
are independent of the optimal number of containers   and hence these two terms are identical. N (
However,   affects the last two terms on the RHS of equation (8). Hence, when we substitute the N (
optimized value of   into equation (8), we get the last two terms on the RHS of equation (11). N, N (,
These last two terms on the RHS of equation (11) depend on the Poisson arrival rate of the containers (α),10
The reader should note the difference in the meanings of the word “cycle” in this section and the previous section 3. In section 3,
a new cycle began every time the inspector returned to the inspection facility. In contrast, in this section, a new cycle begins every
time the inspector leaves the inspection facility.
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the first source of net cost   the second source of net cost   and the expectation of the (c), (C),
inspection time random variable    I.
We now analyze the case in which the focus of our port manager is not on the optimal number
of containers in an inspection cycle but on the temporal frequency of inspections. After computing the
optimal temporal frequency of inspections, we shall compare equation (11) with the corresponding
equation for this latter case in which the port manager’s focus is on the temporal dimension of the
inspection function.
4. The Temporal Policy
Instead of selecting the number of containers optimally, our port manager now pursues an
alternate strategy. In particular, whenever there are no containers in the inspection facility, the
inspector leaves this facility and he returns only after a fixed time period   has gone by. The specific T
task at hand now is to choose   optimally to minimize the   from inspection activities. T LRENC
Let us now calculate the port manager’s   when his focus is on the control variable  LRENC T
and not on the optimal number of containers. As in the previous section, we suppose that containers
arrive at the inspection facility in the port under study in accordance with a Poisson process with rate α.
Further, also as in section 3, we shall use the theory of renewal-reward processes in general and the
renewal-reward theorem in particular to compute the   from inspections.  LRENC
To this end, let us say that a new cycle begins every time the inspector leaves the inspection
facility.
10 Also, from the discussion in the previous section, recall that every cycle has a period during
which the inspector is busy and a period during which the inspector is idle. Given these two points,16
we now follow Batabyal et al. (2001) and condition on   the number of container arrivals in the N(T),
time period in which the inspector is away from the inspection facility, to compute the two
expectations of interest, i.e.,   and   Conditioning on  E[net cost per cycle] E[length of cycle]. N(T),
we get
(12) E[net cost per cycle/N(T)]' j
j'N(T)
j'1
E[ ˆ Cj]%C%cN(T)T
2
.
We shall now use the following four pieces of information to simplify equation (12) further.
First, from equation (6) we get an expression for   Second, from theorem 2.3.1 in Ross (1996, E[ ˆ Cj].
p. 67) we can tell that the times at which the containers arrive at the inspection facility are
independently and uniformly distributed random variables on the interval   Third, from Ross (0,T).
(1996, pp. 59-60) we conclude that   is distributed as a Poisson random variable with mean  N(T) αT.
Finally, from Ross (2003, p. 519) we reason that   Using E[N(T){N(T)&1}]'E[N 2(T)]&E[N(T)]'(αT)2.
these four pieces of information to simplify equation (12), we get
(13) E[net cost per cycle]' (αT)2cE[I]
2(1&αE[I])
%αcTE[Bs]%C%αcT 2
2
.
Our next task is to determine   Once again, conditioning on   and then E[length of cycle]. N(T)
using the properties of the expectation operator (see Ross (1996, p. 21)) we get
(14) E[length of cycle]'E[E[length of cycle/N(T)]]'E[T%N(T)E[B]].
We now focus on the expectation on the extreme RHS of equation (14). Specifically, let us simplify
this expectation using equation (3) and the fact that   This gives us  E[N(T)]'αT.11
The reader can check to see that the pertinent second order condition is satisfied.
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(15) E[length of cycle]'T% αE[I]T
1&αE[I]
' T
1&αE[I]
.
We now divide the RHS of equation (13) by the RHS of equation (15) and then use the result
 to eliminate   After some algebra, we get E[Bs]'αE[I 2]/{2(1&αE[I])2}%E[I]/(1&αE[I]) E[Bs].
(16) LRENC'αcE[I]% α2cE[I 2]
2(1&αE[I])
%αcT
2
%C(1&αE[I])
T
.
Having computed the expression for the   of inspections, we are now in a position to LRENC
state our port manager’s optimization problem. Specifically, this manager chooses the time during
which the inspector is absent from the inspection facility   to minimize the   from inspection T LRENC
activities. Formally, our port manager solves
(17) min{T}[αcE[I]% α2cE[I 2]
2(1&αE[I])
%αcT
2
%C(1&αE[I])
T
].
Using calculus, the optimal time   during which the inspector ought to be absent from the inspection T (
facility is given by
11
(18) T (' 2C(1&αE[I])
αc
.
In words,   equals the square root of the ratio of the product of twice the second source of net cost  T ( (C)18
and the term   to the product of the Poisson arrival rate of the containers   and the first (1&αE[I]) (α)
source of net cost   Inspecting equation (18) it is straightforward to verify two properties of the (c).
optimal leave period   First, as the second source of net cost   goes up, the port manager’s T (.( C)
optimal response calls for lengthening the time period during which the inspector is away from the
inspection facility. In contrast, when the first source of net cost   increases, it is optimal to shorten (c)
the time during which the inspector is absent from the inspection facility.
Let us now substitute the expression for   from equation (18) into the minimand in equation T (
(17). This gives us an expression for the optimized  from inspections given that the inspector’s LRENC
leave period has been selected optimally. Denote this optimized   by   where LRENC (LRENC)
(
TP, TP
denotes the temporal policy. After several steps, we get
(19) (LRENC)
(
TP'αcE[I]% α2cE[I 2]
2(1&αE[I])
% 2αcC(1&αE[I]).
Inspecting equations (16) and (19), we see that the first two terms on the RHSs of these two equations
are independent of the optimal leave period   and hence these two terms are identical. Even so,  T ( T (
impacts the last two terms on the RHS of equation (16). Hence, when we substitute the optimized
value of   into equation (16), we get the last term on the RHS of equation (19). This last term T, T (,
on the RHS of equation (19) is a function of the Poisson arrival rate of the containers   the first (α),
source of net cost   the second source of net cost   and the expectation of the inspection time (c), (C),
random variable    I.
Recall that the objective of our paper is to provide an answer to the following question: Is the LRENC
of inspections lower with the container policy or the temporal policy? We now provide a precise19
answer to this question.
5. The Optimal Inspection Policy in Invasive Species Management
Equations (11) and (19) provide us with expressions for the optimized   when the LRENC
number of containers and the leave period have been chosen optimally. Comparing these two
expressions, we see that
(LRENC)
(
CP'αcE[I]% α2cE[I 2]
2(1&αE[I])
% 2αcC(1&αE[I])& c
2
<
(20) αcE[I]% α2cE[I 2]
2(1&αE[I])
% 2αcC(1&αE[I])'(LRENC)
(
TP.
Equation (20) clearly tells us that the port manager’s   with an optimally chosen number LRENC
of containers in the inspection cycle is lower than his   with an optimally chosen leave period LRENC
in the inspection cycle. It is in this sense that the container policy is superior to the temporal policy.
Put differently, if the port manager had to choose a single control variable from a control set consisting
of the number of containers and the leave period, then this manager would choose the number of
containers over the leave period.
The reader will note that the result described in the previous paragraph is based on explicit
optimization by the port manager. Therefore, it is of some interest to determine whether the superiority
of the container policy result holds when, instead of optimizing, our port manager chooses the leave
period for the inspector on the basis of a rule of thumb. In this inspection context, what might a rule
of thumb temporal policy look like? To answer this question, let us reconsider the expressions for the
two   in equations (8) and (16).  LRENCs20
Inspecting the RHSs of these two equations, we see that the first two terms in both equations
are identical. So no rule of thumb emerges by “eyeballing” these two terms. However, if our port
manager were to equate the two third terms in these two equations, i.e., set   then c(N&1)/2'αcT/2,
he would select   and this is our first rule of thumb. Obviously, this is not the only T1'(N&1)/α
possibility. If the manager equated the two fourth terms on the RHSs of equations (8) and (16), i.e.,
set   then he would choose   and this is our second rule of αC(1&αE[I])/N'C(1&αE[I])/T, T2'N/α
thumb. By substituting these values of   and   into equation (16) and then comparing the emerging T1 T2
two equations with equation (8), the reader can verify that our previous result
 holds for both the above mentioned rules of thumb. From this we conclude (LRENC)
(
CP<(LRENC)
(
TP
that our basic result about the superiority of the container policy is robust. It holds not only when the
port manager chooses the inspection policy on the basis of an explicit optimization exercise but also
when this manager chooses the inspector’s leave period with rules of thumb. 
6. Conclusions
Maritime trade today routinely involves the transport of goods by means of containers on ships
from one region of the world to another. This transport of goods by means of containers on ships often
results in detrimental invasions of new regions by alien plant and animal species. Therefore, if an
apposite authority such as a port manager’s aim is to prevent biological invasions, then this manager
must inspect arriving containers for potentially deleterious biological organisms. Given this state of
affairs, what kind of inspection policy ought a manager to optimally have in place? In particular, is the LRENC
of inspections lower when a port manager follows a policy of inspecting cargo upon the arrival of a
specified number of containers (the container policy) or is this   lower when this manager LRENC
inspects cargo at fixed points in time (the temporal policy)? Our analysis shows that irrespective of21
whether the inspection policy choice is made on the basis of an explicit optimization exercise or on the
basis of rules of thumb, the container policy is superior to the temporal policy because the container
policy results in lower   from inspection activities. LRENC
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. We now make one
substantive suggestion for extending the research described in this paper. Given the work of Roberts
and Spence (1976), environmental economists and regional scientists now know that a pure price
control instrument (fee or tax) and a pure quantity control (emissions permit scheme) instrument can
be combined to create a hybrid control instrument that is part-price and part-quantity in nature.
Roberts and Spence (1976) showed that this hybrid control instrument can always be converted into
a pure price or a pure quantity control instrument. Therefore, in comparison with either a pure price
or a pure quantity control instrument, a regulator will typically do at least as well and possibly much
better with this hybrid control instrument. 
Building on this basic Roberts and Spence (1976) insight, it would be useful to ascertain
whether it is possibly to design a hybrid inspection policy that is part-container and part-temporal in
nature. If this can be done, then the next step would be to determine whether this part-container and
part-temporal hybrid inspection policy dominates the pure container and the pure temporal inspection
policies in terms of, for instance, the   criterion. Studies of invasive species management that LRENC
incorporate this aspect of the inspection policy choice question into the analysis will provide additional
insights into a management problem that has considerable economic and biological consequences.2223
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